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to the stipulation of parties to contracts that international law governs.
He felt that there was a circularity here that needed exploration. The
contract may say that it is governed by international law, but what inter-
national law is there that can be applied to the performance of a contract
between an alien and a state?
Professor SOHN concluded his participation in the panel by linking
the session on contracts held that morning with the discussion regarding
the law of state responsibility. In this connection, he said, there is a large
measure of agreement that the law of the forum may permit choice of
foreign law by contract. However, it is not equally clear that the conflicts
rules are as favorable to the application of international law to the terms
of the contract as has been implied this afternoon. He expressed his
appreciation of the opportunity for discussion of the draft.
Chairman HYDE adjourned the panel with regrets that time had not per-
mitted the articles regarding damages and exhaustion of local remedies
to be reached in the discussion.
PANEL II. CURRENT LEGAL PRoBIwms CONNECTED WITH
INTERNATIONAL TRAVERSING RIVER SYSTEMS
The session reconvened at 2:00 o'clock p.m. in the Chinese Room of the
Mayflower Hotel, Professor Charles E. Martin, Vice President of the
Society, presiding.
THE COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEM
By RALPH W. JOHNSON
Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington
I am honored to have the opportunity of presenting a paper on the
Columbia River system in the company of Dr. Charles Martin, Chairman
of this panel, and Professor Maxwell Cohen, both of whom have written
'comprehensive papers on the Columbia River problem in the past.'
Articles by these and- other scholars have more than adequately covered the
legal questions concerning the meaning and effect of the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909. To rehash these matters before this group would be
hardly useful. However, in recent months several events have taken place
which now seem to justify a re-examination of this problem. In March,
1959; the International Columbia River Engineering Board submitted
its report on the co-operative development of the river to the International
Joint Commission.2 In December, 1959, that Commission submitted to the
governments of Canada and the United States its recommendations for
3Martin, "IThe Diversion of Columbia River Waters," 1957 Proceedings, American
Society of International Law 2; Cohen, "Some Legal and Policy Aspects of the
Columbia River Dispute," 36 Can. Bar Rev. 25 (1958).
2Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin, Report to the International Joint
Commission Prepared by the International Columbia River Engineering Board, 1959.
apportionment of benefits if co-operative development is undertaken. And
thirdly, in the last two years there has been much attention directed at the
Peace River development, which is considered by some as competitive with
the Columbia. Let us examine the effects of these events on the Columbia
River problem.
First let us take a bird's-eye view of the geography of this river and
its tributaries, and of the Canadian-United States negotiations concerning
it. The Columbia is one of the great rivers of this Continent, exceeded
in length and average volume of runoff only by the Mississippi, St.
Lawrence, and possibly the MacKenzie River. With its tributaries it
drains an area of 259,000 square miles. This large basin extends 270
miles north into Canada and 550 miles south into the United States and
has a maximum width of about 730 miles. The Canadian portion contains
about 39,500 square miles, and the United States portion about 219,500
square miles. The river rises in Columbia Lake in Canada and flows a
distance of about 480 miles in British Columbia before entering the United
States. In this distance it is joined by the Kootenay River, which starts
in Canada, very near Columbia Lake, then dips into Montana and Idaho,
and then swerves back into Canada to join the Columbia. The Kootenay
contributes about 11 percent of the total Columbia flow. The Columbia
is also joined in Canada by the Pend Oreille. Most of this river is in the
United States, but it crosses into Canada just 16 miles from its junction
with the Columbia, and contributes about 10 percent of the Columbia's
volume. After the Columbia crosses into Washington it flows an ad-
ditional 745 miles before reaching the Pacific Ocean, making a total dis-
tance from its source at Columbia Lake of 1,225 miles, and a total drop in
that distance of 2,655 feet. While in Washington it is swollen by its
largest tributary, the Snake River, an all-United States river which con-
tributes about 20 percent of the total Columbia volume.
During the past few years the United States has made very substantial
hydro-electric developments on the lower Columbia. These have been made
unilaterally, without either request or permission from Canada, although
certainly under no cloak of secrecy. Canada would like, for her own
purposes, to develop the upper reaches of the river. If this is done, there
will automatically be a substantial benefit to the United States installations
by the leveling of the flow of the river. It is estimated that the down-
stream benefits to the United States by the construction of upstream
storage units in Canada would be in the neighborhood of 1,100,000 to
1,400,000 kw. without construction of any, or only negligible, new fa-
cilities in the United States. Canada takes the position that if these
benefits are the result of its efforts upstream it should be recompensed
for them. Until recently the United States opposed this view. To induce
the United States to recognize the alleged Canadian right to compensation,
Canada is considering two alternatives: (1) the idea of diverting the
Kootenay into the Columbia, and a portion of the Columbia into the all-
Canadian Fraser; and (2) the idea of developing the Peace River before the
Columbia and thus possibly postponing for several years the upstream
development of the latter. This step would also postpone the time when
the United States installations would benefit from Canadian storage.
• There is, of course, no legal question involved in the choice by Canada
to develop the Peace River prior to the Columbia. There may be some
international law problem, either through the 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty, or otherwise, in the question of whether, and how much, the United
States should pay for downstream benefits, although the 1909 Treaty cer-
tainly does not provide any very clear answers to these questions. The
most obvious question of international law arises from the Canadian
position that it has the right to divert the Kootenay into the Columbia, and
then part of the Columbia into the Fraser so that these diverted waters
would never cross into the United States.
Before turning to a discussion of those factors which directly affect the
Columbia River problem, let us look for a moment at the broader picture
of Canadian-United States relations, at certain aspects of that relationship
which, although less directly connected to this controversy, may nevertheless
have some bearing on its eventual resolution.
In the next few years Canada will have to make certain basic policy
decisions which will directly affect her relationship with the United States
in the resources area, as well as the direction she will take for her internal
economic growth. Canadians have discovered that they have vast stores
of natural resources, including oil and gas, hard minerals, timber, and
hydro-electric energy. The Canadian economy at the present time has
barely tapped these resources, and probably will not dip into them sub-
stantially for some years yet. The United States economy, on the other
hand, is at the point where it is seriously looking for new, cheap, resource
stores. The nearest such storehouse is Canada. The United States is still
a long way from running out of presently usable energy sources. But we
are becoming short of readily available ones. During the 1950's, there
was a distinct focus of attention by United States interests on Canadian
natural resources. The question for United States users is substantially
one of price. Will it be cheaper to develop the secondary resource stores
in the United States or to buy such resources from Canada? Canada, on
the other hand, must consider several other factors. She must decide
whether she wishes to sell to the United States, and reap an immediate
financial benefit, or to preserve these resources for future Canadian in-
dustries. The problem of developing a Canadian policy is further com-
plicated by several other factors. Who in Canada will develop and control
these vast stores of natural resources, public or private interests? This
conflict is apparent at the present time in some of the jockeying concern-
ing the competing Peace and Columbia River projects. It appears that
private interests have the inside track on the development of the Peace
River, but that public interests have that track on the competing Co-
lumbia development. Then there is the Provincial-Federal relationship
which probably will have to be developed on a much broader and more
sophisticated scale before full development of the major resources can take
place. The Federal Government has, by the International River Improve-
ments Act of 1954,3 definitely put itself into the arena of resource control.
Provincial governments are still very much in that arena by reason of
their ownership of the resources within their boundaries. In March, 1959,
steps were taken to broaden the base of Federal-Provincial liaison by the
establishment of the Canada-British Columbia Policy Liaison Committee.
This committee was formed for the purpose of presenting a united Canadian
front in international negotiations concerning the Columbia. A technical
Liaison Committee has also been formed to work under that committee.
However, these steps are no more than a beginning and it seems that a
much closer Federal-Provincial integration is both probable and essential.
If analogy to the United States efforts in this field is appropriate, this
Federal-Provincial relationship will take place neither easily nor quickly.
There is also the problem of the political attitudes of Canadians and
Americans toward each other. On the Canadian side, they are genuinely
concerned about the tremendously disparate political and economic power
of their southern neighbor, and the threat that this disparity seems to
hold for them in the matter of controlling the development of their own
resources. This concern is particularly great in connection with hydro-
electric power, where Canadians feel that if they once begin to supply
power to the United States, it may be politically impossible to recapture
it at some later time. It might be observed that much the same kind of
fear seems to be present in the United States Pacific Northwest with re-
gard to the request by Californians for a California power inter-tie to the
Northwest power pool.
South of the border the United States has not yet solved the problem
of how to apportion downstream benefits even from its own upstream in-
stallations, much less those from possible Canadian dams. Senate Bill No.
1782, now in Congress, is directed at providing a formula for solving
this problem. However, there appears to be a considerable difference of
opinion between the Federal Government, the Public Utility Districts, and
the private power companies as to the formula that should be adopted.
The difficulties that must be overcome in solving this question are in many
ways like those that confront the Canadian-United States negotiators in
solving the international apportionment. Furthermore, it would seem that
settlement of the international question will be unlikely, or at least difficult,
until there has been a settlement of the internal United States problem.
The above are only a few of the factors of major significance in the
broader area of Canadian-United States relationships that indirectly con-
cern the co-operative development of the Columbia River Basin. Time
does not permit a more thorough examination of them. Let us therefore
turn to those things that more directly concern the Columbia. Seven
items have been selected as a springboard for this discussion. These are
arranged chronologically as follows:
1. The Columbia River reference of March 9, 1944, where the Inter-
national Joint Commission was directed to investigate and report on the
s Stats. Can., 1955, c. 47.
possibilities of co-operative development by Canada and the United States
of the water resources of the Columbia Basin.
2. The refusal in 1951 and 1954 of the International Joint Commission
to approve the Libby Dam project in Montana, which would have backed up
water into Canada, .and would have inundated one or more potential
Canadian dam sites.
3. The passage by the Canadian Parliament of the International River
Improvements Act in 1954 which killed the proposal then under negotiation
between British Columbia and Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corpora-
tion for the latter to construct the Arrow Lakes Dam just north of the
border.
4. The development in Canada of the idea of diversion of the Kootenay
into the Columbia, and the Columbia into the all-Canadian Fraser.
5. The more recent development in Canada of the idea of starting the
Peace River hydro-power projects before those on the Columbia.
6. The report of the International Columbia River Engineering Board,
submitted to the International Joint Commission in March, 1959.
7. The December, 1959, recommendations for apportionment made by
the International Joint Commission to the Canadian and United States
governments.
In March, 1944, the governments of Canada and the United States
jointly referred to the International Joint Commission the task of in-
vestigating and reporting on the possibilities of co-operative development
of the water resources of the Columbia. While this study was being made,
the United States continued to develop its installations on the river, and
on United States tributaries. One of the projects proposed for construc-
tion in the United States during this time was Libby Dam on the Kootenay
River in Montana. Plans for this dam were drawn in an interim report
of the Joint Columbia River Engineering Board at the request of the
International Joint Commission and appear to have been precipitated by
a serious flood. These plans, as reflected in the application 4 for approval
to the Commission, indicated that the lake to be created would flood about
15,000 acres of land in British Columbia and would extend about 42 miles
into that province. The water level at the border would be raised 150
feet. The Canadian section of the International Joint Commission took
the position that Canada was entitled to a substantial economic return for
the downstream benefits accruing to U.S. installations for this upstream
storage. The United States initially offered to pay only for the clearing
of the land to be flooded, its value, the cost of relocating highways, rail-
roads, and resettling the dispossessed population.5 Although the position of
the United States was later modified (at the time of the 1954 application), 6
there was still such a gap between Canadian and United States views on
4Docket No. 65, International Joint Commission.
5 For a report on these negotiations see Bloomfield and Fitzgerald, Boundary Waters
Problems, Canada and the United States (1958).
GDocket No. 69, International Joint Commission.
return for downstream benefits that the application was never approved.
Nothing further has been done toward the construction of this dam.
About 1953, negotiations took place between Kaiser Aluminum and
Chemical Corporation and the British Columbia Government toward the
construction by the American company of a dam at Arrow Lakes in
Canada. This dam would also provide substantial downstream benefits to
United States installations. While negotiations were still being conducted,
the Canadian Parliament passed the International River Improvements
Act which prohibited the construction of any international river project
without Federal license. No license having been granted for this project,
the proposal died.
The effect of the above and similar Canadian actions has been to hold
off further piecemeal international development of the Columbia until all
of the engineering studies were made, and until such time as an over-all
Canadian-United States master plan is formulated. The wisdom of these
decisions can hardly be questioned. Piecemeal development accomplished
without a master plan is economically unsound. If a plan is adopted or
happens, that calls for less than maximal utilization of basin resources, the
loss to the nations involved usually is irreparable. Hydro-electric and
irrigation facilities cannot be changed once they are installed. It is in fact
unfortunate that the United States has not been able to hold off its own
development of the river until appropriate consideration could be given
to the integration of possible Canadian facilities. We have already perma-
nently lost some of the potential of this basin. Dr. Marion Marts of the
University of Washington recently reported that:
Within the confines of the Columbia Basin itself there are enough
diiculties. Take the case of the upstream storage within the basin.
Of the many power projects constructed in the past fifteen years, only
two are upstream storage projects planned as part of a region-wide,
integrated set of upstream storage reservoirs. . . . The planning cri-
teria underlying other storage projects constructed since Grand Coulee
Dam was built have been local rather than regional in scope. In
1948 and again in 1958, the Corps of Engineers presented very care-
fully developed plans for major control of the Columbia River. Both
of these plans are representative of the best of American river de-
velopment planning practice to date. . . . Both plans presented, among
other things, proposals for a system of upstream storage reservoirs-
all on the United States side of the international boundary. Possible
projects in Canada were recognized as possibilities, but were not fully
taken into account in the development of either plan. Neither hy-
draulic integration nor electrical integration with potential Canadian
sites such as Mica Creek have been taken into account in the criteria
underlying the selection of the recommended projects. It is as if the
Columbia surged full-blown from some underground cavern at the
boundary.7
About the same time that the Libby Dam and Arrow Lakes proposals
were stalled, a new idea was generated in Canada-diversion. This possi-
bility still exists. Certainly there is no doubt that physically it could be
Address to League of Women Voters, Seattle, Washington, Jan. 28, 1960.
done. There is also no doubt that if the Columbia were diverted, the
power potential of the Fraser would be enormously increased, although
as yet there appear to be no accurate figures as to the amount of that
increase. There are, however, at least three important reasons restraining
Canada from making this diversion. First, to do so would be very diffi-
cult politically because of the damage that would accrue to the Fraser
River fishing industry, and the wrath that would be created among a large
body of British Columbia voters. Secondly, there is an apparently un-
resolved question whether the diversions would be as economically beneficial
to Canada as would the development of the Columbia, assuming, of course,
that Canada is able to work out some reasonable formula for sharing the
United States downstream benefits. Thirdly, a very considerable amount
of ill will on the United States side of the boundary would certainly result.
The development of the Peace River in the near future also poses some
very special problems for Canadians. Studies in the past two years by the
Wenner-Gren interests under agreement with the British Columbia Pro-
vineial Government reveal that the initial dam in this project would gen-
erate about 750,000 kw. This would be cheap power at site, but the
problem lies in the fact that the site is 650 miles north of the border, and
about the same distance from the areas of potential use in British Columbia.
It has been said 8 that this power could be delivered in Vancouver, B. C.,
for about six mills per kw. hour, but even this figure may be optimistic.
Selling to United States consumers may be difficult because of the probable
high price, and may be undesirable to Canadians because of their concern
over ability to recapture. Delivery to Canadian points, it has been said,
might swamp the available market and thus result in uneconomical use for
some yearsY It is also said that development of the Columbia before the
Peace River would not pose such problems because (1) it can be done on
a step-by-step basis, and would not produce such a massive first dose, and
(2) it would involve shorter transmission to the existing markets.
There is, of course, almost no limit to the potential market for cheap
electricity in the Pacific Northwest. However, the present markets in this
region are somewhat limited. Thus it would seem that one of the prob-
able results of the early development of the Peace River would be delay
on the upper Columbia.
In view of the above problems regarding the Peace River development
it may be asked why this proposal is being emphasized in Canada. A
partial answer might be found in the remarks of Hon. R. G. Williston,
in a speech from the Throne Debate, B.C. Legislative Assembly, on Febru-
ary 3, 1960, where he said:
When the history of this last few years is written, no one will be
able to argue that the Peace River power potential has not had great
influence on International negotiations concerning the Columbia River.
I first indicated need for a realistic alternative to Columbia River
power when reporting to this House on my 1957 meeting in Wash-
8 Address by Charles W. Nash, Director of Load Development, 13.C. Power Commission,
Dee. 10, 1959. o Ibid.
ington. I was convinced at that time there never would be interna-
tional agreement on a downstream benefit return related to value
created so long as the Americans felt Canadians would be forced to
develop the River for their own power needs within a period of ten
to fifteen years. Any such Canadian development would have auto-
matically afforded the Americans some of the necessary storage on the
River at no cost and would thus have destroyed our bargaining po-
sition.
You will recall that plans were prepared which would allow for the
diversion of part of the flow of the Columbia River to the Fraser.
It was hoped this would bring the Americans to the bargaining table
seeking an agreement to the benefit problem which would be ac-
ceptable to Canada. However, such a proposal only succeeded in
making them angry. When they examined the plan seriously, they
soon became convinced that Canada would not divert Columbia water
to the Fraser because of the very valuable fish runs which would be
affected adversely by any power development constructed to use the
water.
However, as soon as the power potential of the Peace River was
known, a change in American strategy became evident. The desire to
negotiate finally become so keen that it has been difficult to find time
to formulate and adopt a united Canadian position on the best Co-
lumbia plan of development ...
Quite understandably Canada is now in a position to insist that the United
States give serious consideration to Canada's demands for a substantial
return for downstream benefits conferred on the United States by upstream
storage. No longer can the United States ignore these demands in view
of the very real alternative of the Peace River project. Furthermore, al-
though it may be true that ideally the Columbia is the better place for
Canada to start, still if the economic return offered by the United States,
in power or otherwise, is too small, then it might be to Canada's advantage
to develop the Peace River project first. The United States must bargain
with this fact in mind. If it sufficiently desires the early development of
the upstream storage on the Columbia, then an appropriately attractive
offer must be made.
In connection with the 1959 Report of the International Columbia
River Engineering Board it may be appropriate to comment on the ob-
jective that should be sought in the hydro-electric development of any
international river. In view of the ultimate needs of mankind for energy,
that objective must ordinarily be the plan bringing the greatest energy
return. As a prerequisite to such development, there should be a gathering
and analysis of all relevant data. Comprehensive studies of hydrology,
topography, and geology of a river basin are expensive and time-consuming.
However, they are essential if the goal of maximal development is to be
achieved or even approached. The failure to have in hand such data has
already cost the United States permanent loss of some of the potential
of the Columbia. However, it now appears that we have most of the facts
necessary to make an intelligent master plan for the still undeveloped
portion of the basin. At this point the principal danger (although not
the only one) is that a "second best" plan will be adopted because of either
internal or international political pressures. What effect can these pres-
sures have? They might lead to several results on the Columbia: (1)
indefinite delay in development of the upper portion of the basin, (2)
adoption of an inefficient plan of development, reflecting the strongest
internal and international political pressures, or (3) adoption and effectua-
tion of the most efficient plan. If the political pressures are such that the
third plan would, by reason of geographical location, give to one nation
an "excessive" share of benefits, then the better solution is not to alter the
master plan for a less efficient one, but to negotiate for the transfer of
power or other benefits to the deficit nation.
We now have substantially all of the facts upon which to base an in-
telligent master plan for the development of the upper Columbia. These
facts are contained primarily in the Report of the International Columbia
River Engineering Board of March, 1959.
The objective of the Engineering Board was to investigate and determine
the possibilities for co-operative development of the water resources of the
Columbia Basin. The official abstract of the report says:
The water resources of the Columbia River basin can be developed
for a variety of purposes. Maximum utilization of these resources
can be achieved only by implementation of a comprehensive plan of
development covering all parts of the basin. Such a plan should
reconcile-as far as possible-competing and alternative uses. A key
requirement would be the provision of the maximum practical amount
of -upstream storage. With resulting relatively complete flow regula-
tion [50 million acre feet as compared with present storage of 13.3
million acre feet] increased power output and flood control would be
provided and water supplies for most of the other uses would be
assured. The plans presented in the report have been formulated
mainly on physical and economic factors related to hydro-electric
power development.
The original purpose of this report was to present from an inter-
national viewpoint the best over-all plan of development, with possible
alternatives, for maximum practicable utilization of the water re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin. However, the studies which
have been carried out indicate that each of three plans achieves about
the same degree of water resource development, particularly with re-
spect to hydro-electric power. The various plans studied and set
forth herein are based principally on engineering and economic con-
siderations; they take no cognizance of the international boundary.10
The report then sets out in detail each of the three plans mentioned.
Two of them call for diversion of part, or all, of the Kootenay River into
the Columbia at Columbia Lake. This water would then go down the
main stem of the Columbia for use in both Canadian and United States
facilities. The third plan envisions a separate system of dams on the
Kootenay, with no diversion. As to whether co-operative development
would be better than unilateral action the report concludes:
In the three important fields of water power, 'flood control, and
irrigation, greater use of the waters of the Columbia River system
3o Citea note 2 above.
can be made possible by cooperative development of certain water
resources in each country.
The largest and most valuable benefit to be obtained from water
resources developments in the Columbia River basin is the production
of hydro-electric power. Further, power benefits in both countries
can be materially increased by cooperative development and operation
of storage and power projects to conform to a plan of basin develop-
ment.
It is physically and economically feasible to develop a system
of power plants that will produce an average of more than 16 million
kilowatts utilizing about 50,000,000 acre-feet of storage.
Although the report is reputed to be excellent as far as it goes, it has
been sharply criticized for failing to provide adequate information on one
very important matter, i.e., the sequence and timing of basin development.
Mr. John V. Krutilla, writing for Resources for the Future, Inc., in Febru-
ary, 1960,11 points out that the excuse usually urged by engineers for this
deficiency is their inability at the time of the survey to evaluate a project on
the basis of an incremental analysis because of lack of knowledge of which
project will be built first and which will be built last. The report of the
International Columbia River Engineering Board acknowledges the im-
portance of timing, but nevertheless omits comprehensive information on
it. In criticism of such an approach Mr. Krutilla says:
It is true that second-guessing political events is not the function of
river basin planning and project evaluation. But their function cer-
tainly should be to define a system in which benefits are maximized;
this in turn requires specifying the most economical sequence as well
as the most economical projects in a system of works. Regardless of
whether the most efficient sequence will in fact be followed, the bases
for determining the costs of departures from the most economical
sequence should be available for consideration by those ultimately
charged with responsibility for deciding on a plan of action.12
It seems unfortunate that this information was not included in the report
in view of the need of Canadian and United States negotiators to have all
relevant data at hand for the consideration of a comprehensive plan and
treaty. It should also be pointed out that the December 29, 1959, report
of the International Joint Commission on "Principles for Determining and
Apportioning Benefits from Cooperative Use of Storage Waters and Elec-
trical Inter-Connection Within the Columbia River System" contains no
specific recommendation for a sequential or incremental approach to basin
development. These recommendations provide in General Principle No. 1:
Cooperative development of the water resources of the Columbia
River Basin, designed to provide optimum benefits to each country,
requires that the storage facilities and downstream power production
facilities proposed by the respective countries will, to the extent it is
practicable and feasible to do so, be added in the order of the most
11 Krutilla, Sequence and Timing in River Basin Development, with Special Applica-
tion to Canadian-United States Columbia River Basin Planning (Feb. 1960) (Pamphlet
published by Resources for the Future, Inc.). 12 Ibid. at 2.
favorable benefit-cost ratio, with due consideration of factors not re-
flected in the ratio.
This same thought is embodied in other recommendations of the Commis-
sion. These recommendations 'do not deny the validity of the sequential
or incremental approach to basin development, but they nevertheless fall
far short of specifically recommending it. It is hoped that as the plans and
negotiations for the development of this basin progress, the necessary full-
scale computer studies will be made to provide information on the economics
of incremental development.
The International Joint Commission recommendations for apportionment
referred to above have been adopted by Canada but not the United States.
They are now in the hands of the special negotiators for both Canada and
the United States and presumably are being considered in the negotiations
now taking place toward the formulation of an appropriate treaty. Under-
standably, these negotiations are being conducted privately and thus little
public information is available about them. However, we can inspect the
recommendations of the International Joint Commission which were made
for the benefit of these negotiators. Their main idea is contained in Power
Principle No. 6, and in Flood Control Principle No. 4. Power Principle
No. 6 recommends:
The power benefits determined to result in the downstream country
from regulation of flow of storage in the upstream country should be
shared on a basis such that the benefit, in power, to each country will
be substantially equal ...
A similar recommendation is made concerning downstream flood control
benefits in Flood Control Principle No. 4.
The upstream country should be paid one-half of the benefits as meas-
ured in Flood Control Principle No. 3, i.e., one-half of the value of the
damages prevented.
These and the other recommendations of the Commission do not purport
to give answers for all questions concerning apportionment. Much of the
hard bargaining about allocation of specific benefits was left to the nego-
tiators now working on a possible treaty. One of the points which was most
contentious, and about which no agreement was reached, was whether the
division of power benefits referred. to "gross" or "net" benefits. As re-
ported by the Honorable R. G. Williston, Minister of Lands and Forests of
British Columbia, in February, 1960,13 the term "gross"
. . . was implied to mean that the additional power generated through
the use of Canadian stored water would be divided equally, with the
Canadian share being delivered free-of-charge to the border. "Net"
implied that before any sharing, a first charge upon all the electricity
generated by the approved and regulated Canadian storage would be
the costs of all works constructed to store the water and then generate
the electricity.
is Address from the Throne Debate, B.C. Legislative Assembly, Feb. 3, 1960.
Mr. Williston argued against the use of the "net" concept as follows:
Such "netting" procedure would be extremely complicated and would
create a situation wherein every expenditure of the past or future and
all planning in either country would be subject to international scru-
tiny and approval-which would be highly impractical. Not only
would sovereignty over our own resources thus be challenged, but the
carrying charges on the vast installations already in place and others
still to be constructed south of the border would leave little actual
"net" benefit for Canada for many years to come. •
It would thus appear that the present negotiators have much to do. It
should be pointed out, however, that the "netting" procedure suggested
above by Mr. Williston is not the only one available to the negotiators.
It is also possible to charge against the gross the cost of all the new Can-
adian facilities, and only the added cost to United States facilities resulting
from the increased upstream storage. This procedure would, of course,
weigh in favor of Canada. Then there are any number of combinations of
these systems that could be used.
One of the most significant aspects of the recommendations is the degree
of international co-operation called for, the quality and range of which
would appear to be unprecedented in United States-Canadian relations.
The general comments at the beginning of the report suggest that "signifi-
cant economies and advantages" can be had by both countries "through
the cooperative use of generation and transmission facilities." In the dis-
cussion of power principles the report recognizes that significant changes
in the general setting of power generation may occur during the life of any
negotiated agreement, as, for example, that the Pacific Northwest region
of the United States may change from a predominantly hydro-electric
power system to a predominantly thermal one. This change will neces-
sarily result in changes in the character of benefits that will accrue to
downstream installations from upstream storage. Power Principle No. 2
specially provides for a review every five years of power benefits attribut-
able to the upstream storage. The Commission also recommends extensive
and continuing co-operation in the matter of transmission. It says:
Although such delivery could be accomplished initially with a some-
what limited degree of interconnection, the Commission is of the opin-
ion that provision should be made for the eventual development of a
broader, long range plan for cooperative operation of the intercon-
nected power systems of the two countries.
At still another place the Commission suggests that an upstream storage
plan that is to be practicable must be conducted according to an "assured
plan of operation," i.e., it must be operated in a way that will permit
reliance by downstream units. Thus there will have to be continuing co-
operative examination of runoff, conflicting water needs, changing generat-
ing capacities, et cetera. In a similar way the Commission recommends a
long-range plan of information exchange in connection with flood control.
To be effective the flood control aspect of the development will have to be
flexible, will have to be adjusted year by year and month by month to
accommodate the variations in runoff and changing storage capacities.
Flood control benefits are to be paid in cash, and annual determinations will
,have to be made of the amounts of these benefits.
Implicit in these recommendations for extensive and continuing co-opera-
tion is the idea that there ought to be established some joint administrative
body vested with wide powers to collect and analyze information, and to
make binding decisions. It would be unfortunate to set up such a program
and then shackle it by failing to establish an effective, adequately empow-
ered administrative body. If the International Joint Commission is to be
this administrative body, then its powers should be substantially broadened
beyond those provided in the 1909 Treaty. Under that treaty it has only
limited powers. In practice, on important issues, it has acted merely as a
fact-finding body. It cannot make the kind of day-by-day decisions that
will have to be made if the co-operative development of the Columbia is
to become fact.
Neither the United States nor Canada is likely to engage in co-operative
development of any kind, unless co-operation will return to each nation
more benefit than unilateral action would. This is not international law,
it is simply economic fact, a fact which is expressly recognized in the recom-
mendations in General Principle No. 2, which provides:
Cooperative development of the water resources of the Columbia .. .
should result in advantages in power supply, flood control, or other
benefits, or savings in costs to each country as compared with alterna-
tives available to that country.
Power Principle No. 6 and Flood Control Principle No. 4, the two key
principles in the recommendations, are both expressly qualified by reference
to this General Principle. Power Principle No. 6 states that the sharing
recommended therein should:
result in an advantage to each country as compared with alternatives
available to that country, as contemplated in General Principle No. 2.
• . .Where such sharing would not result in an advantage to each
country as contemplated in General Principle No. 2, there should be
negotiated and agreed upon such other division of benefits or other
adjustments as would be equitable to both countries and -would make
the cooperative development feasible.
The discussion following Flood Control Principle No. 4 says:
In the event that application of this principle should indicate a pay-
ment to the upstream country greater than the estimated cost of alter-
native means of obtaining equivalent flood control in the United States
the requirement of General Principle No. 2 that there should be an
advantage as compared with available alternatives would not be satis-
fied and consideration should be given to this circumstance in the
negotiations.
Now let us return to the Boundary Waters Treaty. First, it should be
noted that there are two places where that treaty is expressly mentioned in
the Joint Commission's recommendations for apportionment. The Com-
mission says that it "approached the problem of formulating principles
within the context and intent of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909."
The treaty is also expressly mentioned in General Principle No. 3. Thus
the treaty is being considered, as it must be, in the current negotiations.
It will also have to be considered if these negotiations bog down, and
Canada and the United States again seriously consider unilateral action.
Does the treaty give Canada the right unilaterally to divert? Its plain
wording, as well as its historical background, would seem to say yes. On
the other side, some writers have relied on the fact that in Article II the
word "party" is sometimes spelled with a big "P" and sometimes with a
little one. From this they conclude that the article was intended to bind
only private "parties" as opposed to nation "Parties." Yet it seems that
if such a significant distinction were to be made, it would have been spelled
out more plainly than by the size of a letter. Another United States
defense has been "rebus sic stantbus"--the tacit condition said to attach
to all treaties that they cease to be obligatory when the state of facts upon
which they were founded has substantially changed. Whether one believes
that the key facts upon which this treaty was founded have changed suf-
ficiently to justify this argument seems largely to be a question of whether
one lives in Canada or in the United States. Somewhat akin to the "rebus
sic stantibus" issue is the question involving the remedies under Article II
for damage to the United States interests by a possible Canadian diversion.
One theory proposed is that the United States interests would have no
remedy in Canada as provided in the treaty because the United States party
would not be a licensee under the British Columbia Water Act, and thus
would have no standing in a Canadian court. Yet it can hardly be seri-
ously urged that the framers of the treaty intended that their provisions
concerning remedies would be a nullity. The treaty is woefully deficient
on this point. As a matter of fact, even a cursory study of the treaty will
reveal that it is woefully deficient on many points as regards the present
development of the Columbia Basin. It would seem that to handle this
current development on the basis of the 1909 Treaty would be akin to an
attempt to assemble a Boeing Jet 707 aided only by the Wright brothers'
blueprints for the plane they flew in 1903 at Kitty Hawk.
Conclusion
In conclusion may it be suggested that there are two approaches that
international lawyers might currently make to the study of the Columbia
River problem. The first is that which concerns itself primarily with the
meaning and effect of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, and the rights
of the parties arising from that treaty in the event of ultimate disagreement
about apportionment. Studies of this aspect of the problem are appro-
priate and necessary in order that the two nations shall understand fully
their ultimate legal rights. A number of such studies have already been
made. The second approach concerns itself primarily with the shaping of
a new relationship between these two countries. It takes into consideration
the 1909 Treaty, but focuses attention on the current social, economic, and
political facts which give rise to the present controversy, and to which the
